Security advisory: budget check could be bypassed in kazenai before 1.2.0
In kazenai and kazenai-finops 1.0.1 through 1.1.3, some OpenAI calls on a monitored client reached the provider without a budget check. Fixed in 1.2.0; the affected releases are yanked.
Affected: kazenai and kazenai-finops 1.0.1 through 1.1.3.
Fixed in: 1.2.0 (2026-10-28). Yanked on PyPI (2026-10-30): every published kazenai and kazenai-finops release from 1.0.1 through 1.1.3.
Action: upgrade to 1.2.1, the latest release (1.2.0 has the fix too).
GitHub advisory: GHSA-2x2g-x54j-cj3m.
python -m pip install --upgrade "kazenai-finops[openai]==1.2.1"
What happened
monitor() wraps a provider client so that every paid call is checked against a
budget before it is sent. On a monitored OpenAI client, these paths went to
OpenAI with no pre-call check and no recorded cost:
responses.parseandresponses.with_raw_response.parse(sync and async);with_raw_response.create/with_streaming_response.createonchat.completionsorresponseswhen the wrapper was first accessed beforemonitor(), because the SDK caches it with the unpatched method;- legacy
client.completions.create; client.realtime.connect,client.beta.realtime.connect, and on openai 2.xresponses.compact/responses.connect;- any provider method, raw or streaming wrapper, or
client.requestthat your code saved before callingmonitor(), and directclient.post(...).
The same pattern applied to Anthropic clients.
Impact
Calls made through these paths could exceed a configured budget and were not
recorded. Calls made through the documented methods (chat.completions.create,
messages.create, read from the client after monitor()) were checked as
expected.
The fix
1.2.0 rebuilds cached wrappers from the guarded methods, supports the Responses
API under the same checks, and adds a request gate: a monitored client checks
each request it sends and refuses a paid request that did not come through one
of its guarded methods, before anything reaches the provider. Endpoints outside
the supported surface (embeddings, images, audio, batches, fine-tuning) are
refused unless you name them in allow_unmetered; that spend is not counted.
Code that holds the API key and creates another client, or sends raw HTTP, is
outside what monitor() can cover.
Reporting
Report security issues privately to [email protected]. Please don’t open a public issue; we will acknowledge your report and coordinate a fix and disclosure.